Mean Field Games and Systemic Risk by Carmona, Rene et al.
MEAN FIELD GAMES AND SYSTEMIC RISK
RENE´ CARMONA∗, JEAN-PIERRE FOUQUE† , AND LI-HSIEN SUN‡
Abstract.
We propose a simple model of inter-bank borrowing and lending where the evolution of the log-
monetary reserves of N banks is described by a system of diffusion processes coupled through their
drifts in such a way that stability of the system depends on the rate of inter-bank borrowing and
lending. Systemic risk is characterized by a large number of banks reaching a default threshold by
a given time horizon. Our model incorporates a game feature where each bank controls its rate of
borrowing/lending to a central bank. The optimization reflects the desire of each bank to borrow
from the central bank when its monetary reserve falls below a critical level or lend if it rises above
this critical level which is chosen here as the average monetary reserve. Borrowing from or lending
to the central bank is also subject to a quadratic cost at a rate which can be fixed by the regulator.
We solve explicitly for Nash equilibria with finitely many players, and we show that in this model the
central bank acts as a clearing house, adding liquidity to the system without affecting its systemic
risk. We also study the corresponding Mean Field Game in the limit of large number of banks in the
presence of a common noise.
Key words. Systemic risk, interbank borrowing and lending, stochastic games, Nash equilib-
rium, Mean Field Game.
Subject classifications. 60H30, 91A15, 91G20, 93E20
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1. Introduction
Systemic risk is becoming a central research topic. We refer to the Handbook
[8] for recent developments on systemic risk from many points of view (Statistics,
Finance, Mathematical Finance, Behavioral Finance, Networks, Counterparty Risk,
High Frequency Trading, ...). Here, we propose a simple model of inter-bank bor-
rowing and lending where the evolution of the log-monetary reserves of N banks is
described by a system of diffusion processes coupled through their drifts in such a way
that stability of the system depends on the rate of inter-bank borrowing and lending.
Systemic risk is characterized by a large number of banks reaching a default threshold
by a given time horizon. This type of interaction and the relation stability–systemic
risk has been recently studied in [9], [10], [11], and [12]. Here, we introduce a game
feature where each bank controls its rate of borrowing/lending to a central bank. The
control of each individual bank reflects the desire to borrow from the central bank
when its monetary reserve falls below a critical level or lend if it rises above this
critical level which is chosen here as the average monetary reserve. Borrowing from
or lending to the central bank is also subject to a quadratic cost at a rate which can
be fixed by the regulator. As written, our model is an example of Linear-Quadratic
Mean Field Game with finitely many players which can be solved explicitly. We first
solve for open-loop equilibria using the Pontryagin stochastic maximum principle. We
also solve for closed-loop equilibria using the probabilistic approach based on the Pon-
tryagin stochastic maximum principle leading to the solution of Forward-Backward
Stochastic Differential Equations, and the dynamic programming principle leading to
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2 Mean Field Games and Systemic Risk
the solution of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman partial differential equations. We also study
the corresponding Mean Field Game in the limit of a large number of banks. Adding
a game component to the model has a non-trivial effect on the stability of the sys-
tem which our simple model enables to analyze. Our conclusion is that inter-bank
borrowing and lending creates stability, this stability is enhanced by the possibility of
borrowing and lending from a central bank which in our model appears as a clearing
house providing additional liquidity, and systemic risk is described as a rare event
with probability quantified by large deviation theory.
In the model discussed below, the diffusion processes Xit for i = 1, . . . , N rep-
resent the log-monetary reserves of N banks lending to and borrowing from each
other. The system is driven by N (possibly correlated) standard Brownian motions
W˜ it , i = 1, · · · , N written as W˜ it = ρW 0t +
√
1− ρ2W it where W jt , j = 0, 1, · · · , N are
independent standard Brownian motions, W 0t being the common noise, and |ρ| ≤ 1.
The system starts at time t = 0 from i.i.d. random variables Xi0 = ξ
i independent
of the Brownian motions and such that E(ξi) = 0. We assume that the diffusion
coefficients are constant and identical, denoted by σ > 0. Our model of lending and
borrowing consists in introducing an interaction through drift terms representing the
rate at which bank i borrows from or lends to bank j. In this case, the rates are
proportional to the difference in log-monetary reserves, and our model is:
dXit =
a
N
N∑
j=1
(Xjt −Xit) dt+ αitdt+ σdW˜ it , i = 1, . . . , N, (1.1)
where the overall rate of “mean-reversion” a/N has been normalized by the number
of banks with a ≥ 0. Bank i controls its rate of borrowing/lending to a central bank
through the control rate αit. Using the notation
Xt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Xit ,
for the empirical mean, the dynamics can be rewritten in the mean field form:
dXit =
[
a(Xt −Xit) + αit
]
dt+ σdW˜ it , i = 1, · · · , N. (1.2)
Bank i ∈ {1, · · · , N} controls its rate of lending and borrowing at time t by choosing
the control αit in order to minimize
J i(α1, · · · , αN ) = E
{∫ T
0
fi(Xt, α
i
t)dt+ gi(X
i
T )
}
, (1.3)
where the running cost function fi is defined by
fi(x, α
i) =
[
1
2
(αi)2 − qαi(x− xi) + 
2
(x− xi)2
]
, (1.4)
and the terminal cost function gi by
gi(x) =
c
2
(
x− xi)2 . (1.5)
Notice that the running quadratic cost 12 (α
i)2 has been normalized and that the effect
of the parameter q > 0 is to control the incentive to borrowing or lending: the bank i
R. Carmona, J.-P Fouque, L.-H. Sun 3
will want to borrow (αit > 0) if X
i
t is smaller than the empirical mean (Xt) and lend
(αit < 0) if X
i
t is larger than Xt. Equivalently, after dividing by q > 0, this parameter
can be thought as a control by the regulator of the cost of borrowing or lending (with
q large meaning low fees).
The quadratic terms in
(
x− xi)2 in the running cost ( > 0) and in the terminal
cost (c > 0) penalize departure from the average. We assume that
q2 ≤ , (1.6)
so that fi(x, α) is convex in (x, α).
In the spirit of structural models of defaults, we introduce a default level D < 0
and say that bank i defaults by time T if its log-monetary reserve reached the level D
before time T . Note that in this simple model, even after reaching the default level,
bank i stays in the system until time T and continues to participate in inter-bank and
central bank borrowing and lending activities.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall the results of the descrip-
tive model presented in [10] without control, that is αit = 0. We illustrate the fact
that inter-bank borrowing and lending creates stability, and we define and quantify
the systemic risk.
Section 3 is devoted to the analysis of the stochastic differential game (1.2-1.3).
We derive exact Nash equilibria for the open-loop as well as for the closed-loop Marko-
vian models, using both probabilist and analytic approaches.
The financial implications in terms of liquidity and role of a central bank are
discussed in Section 4.
Stochastic differential games with a large number of players are usually not
tractable. It is because of the very special nature of our model (linear dynamics,
quadratic costs, and interactions through the empirical mean) that we are able to
construct explicitly Nash equilibria, both open and closed loops. For generic models
which are not amenable to explicit solutions, Lasry and Lions [18, 19, 20] have recently
provided an elegant way to tackle the construction of approximate Nash equilibria for
large games with mean field interactions. Their methodology, known as Mean Field
Game (MFG), has been applied to a wide variety of problems (see [13, 17] for some ex-
amples). A similar research program was developed independently by Caines, Huang,
and Malhame´ with the name of Nash Certainty Equivalent. See for example [14] and
[15]. The approach of Lasry and Lions (e.g. [20]) is based on the solution of a system
of partial differential equations (PDEs): a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation evolv-
ing backward in time, and a Kolmogorov equation evolving forward in time, these
two PDEs being strongly coupled. By its probabilistic nature, it is natural to recast
the MFG strategy using appropriate forms of the Pontryagin stochastic maximum
principle, leading to the solution of new models. See, for example, [6, 2, 5, 4] or [7]
for a probabilistic approach based on the weak formulation of stochastic control. We
consider the MFG problem and discuss the existence of approximate Nash equilibria
in Section 5.
2. Stability and Systemic Risk
In this section, we consider a system of N banks without the possibility of bor-
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Fig. 2.1. One realization of N = 10 trajectories of the coupled diffusions (2.1) (left plot)
with a = 10 and trajectories of independent Brownian motions (a = 0) (right plot) using the same
Gaussian increments. The solid horizontal line represents the “default” level D = −0.7.
rowing or lending to a central bank, that is (1.1) or (1.2) with αit = 0:
dXit =
a
N
N∑
j=1
(Xjt −Xit) dt+ σdW˜ it
= a(Xt −Xit)dt+ σdW˜ it , i = 1, · · · , N. (2.1)
To start with, we assume that the Brownian motions W˜ i are independent, that is
ρ = 0 and W˜ i = W i. For simplicity, we also assume that Xi0 = ξ
i = 0. In Section
2.4, we will consider the correlated (or common noise) case.
2.1. Simulations
In Figure 2.1 we show a typical realization of the N trajectories with a relatively
large rate of borrowing/lending a = 10, the diffusion coefficient being set at σ = 1
(we used the Euler scheme with a time-step ∆ = 10−4, up to time T = 1). We see
that the trajectories generated by (2.1) are more grouped than the ones generated by
independent Brownian motions corresponding to no inter-bank borrowing or lending
(a = 0). This is the “swarming” or “flocking” effect more pronounced for a larger
rate a. Consequently, less (or almost no) trajectories will reach the default level D,
creating stability of the system.
Next, we compare the loss distribution (distribution of number of defaults) for
the coupled and independent cases. We compute these loss distributions by Monte
Carlo method using 104 simulations, and with the same parameters as previously.
In the independent case (a = 0), the loss distribution is Binomial(N, p) with
parameter p given by
p = P
(
min
0≤t≤T
(σWt) ≤ D
)
= 2Φ
(
D
σ
√
T
)
,
where Φ denotes the N (0, 1)-cdf, and we used the explicitly known distribution of the
minimum of a Brownian motion. With our choice of parameters, we have p ≈ 0.5 and
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Fig. 2.2. On the left, we show plots of the loss distribution for the coupled diffusions with
a = 10 (solid line) and for the independent Brownian motions (dashed line). The plots on the right
show the corresponding tail probabilities.
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Fig. 2.3. On the left, we show plots of the loss distribution for the coupled diffusions with
a = 100 (solid line) and for the independent Brownian motions (dashed line). The plots on the right
show the corresponding tail probabilities.
therefore, the corresponding loss distribution is almost symmetric as can be seen on
the left panels (dashed lines) in Figures 2.2 and 2.3. We see that increasing a, that is
the rate of inter-bank borrowing and lending, pushes most of the mass to zero default,
in other words, it improves the stability of the system by keeping the diffusions near
zero (away from default) most of the time. However, we also see that there is a small
but non-negligible probability, that almost all diffusions reach the default level. On
the right panels of Figures 2.2 and 2.3 we zoom on this tail probability. In fact, this
tail corresponds to the small probability of the ensemble average reaching the default
level, and to almost all diffusions following this average due to “flocking” for large a.
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2.2. Mean-field Limit
From (2.1) we see that the processes (Xit)’s are “OUs” mean-reverting to their
ensemble average (Xt). Summing up the equations in (2.1) and using X
i
0 = 0, i =
1, . . . , N , one observes that this ensemble average is given by
Xt =
σ
N
N∑
i=1
W it , (2.2)
which is distributed as a Brownian motion with diffusion coefficient σ/
√
N indepen-
dently of a.
In the limit N →∞, the strong law of large numbers gives
1
N
N∑
j=1
W jt → 0 a.s. ,
and, more generally, the processes Xit given by
Xit =
σ
N
N∑
j=1
W jt + σe
−at
∫ t
0
easdW is −
σ
N
N∑
j=1
(
e−at
∫ t
0
easdW js
)
,
converge to the independent OU processes σe−αt
∫ t
0
eαsdW is with long-run mean zero.
This is in fact a simple example of a mean-field limit and propagation of chaos studied
in general in [21].
2.3. Large Deviations and Systemic Risk
In this section, we focus on the event where the ensemble average given by (2.2)
reaches the default level. The probability of this event is small (when N becomes
large), and is given by the theory of Large Deviations. In our simple example, this
probability can be computed explicitly as follows:
P
(
min
0≤t≤T
(
σ
N
N∑
i=1
W it
)
≤ D
)
= P
(
min
0≤t≤T
W˜t ≤ D
√
N
σ
)
= 2Φ
(
D
√
N
σ
√
T
)
, (2.3)
where W˜ is a standard Brownian motion and Φ is the N (0, 1)-cdf. Therefore, using
classical equivalent for the Gaussian cumulative distribution function, we obtain
lim
N→∞
− 1
N
logP
(
min
0≤t≤T
(
σ
N
N∑
i=1
W it
)
≤ D
)
=
D2
2σ2T
. (2.4)
In other words, for a large number of banks, the probability that the ensemble average
reaches the default barrier is of order exp(−D2N/(2σ2T )). Recalling (2.2), we identify{
min
0≤t≤T
Xt ≤ D
}
(2.5)
as a systemic event. Observe that this event does not depend on a > 0, in other
words, increasing stability by increasing the rate of borrowing and lending a does not
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prevent a systemic event where a large number of banks default. In fact, once in
this event, increasing a creates even more defaults by “flocking to default”. This is
illustrated in the Figure 2.3, where a = 100 and the probability of systemic risk is
roughly 3% (obtained using formula (2.3)).
To summarize this section, our simple model with prescribed dynamics (no game)
and independent noises shows that “lending and borrowing improves stability but also
contributes to systemic risk”. We have quantified this behavior and identified the
crucial role played by the inter-bank rate of borrowing and lending.
2.4. Systemic Risk and Common Noise
In this section, we discuss the coupled diffusions driven by correlated Brownian
motions (W˜ it ) and without control (α
i = 0). The dynamics (1.1) or (1.2) becomes:
dXit = a
 1
N
N∑
j=1
Xjt −Xit
 dt+ σ (ρdW 0t +√1− ρ2dW it) , i = 1, · · · , N, (2.6)
where
(
W 0t ,W
i
t , i = 1, · · · , N
)
are independent standard Brownian motions and W 0t
is a common noise. As previously, we calculate the ensemble average
1
N
N∑
i=1
Xit =
σ
N
N∑
i=1
W˜ it = σ
(
ρW 0t +
√
1− ρ2
N
N∑
i=1
W it
)
D
= σ
√
ρ2 +
(1− ρ2)
N
Bt,
where Bt is a standard Brownian motion. Moreover, the explicit solution for X
i
t is
Xit = σρW
0
t + σ
√
1− ρ2
 1
N
N∑
j=1
W jt +
∫ t
0
ea(s−t)dW is −
1
N
N∑
j=1
∫ t
0
ea(s−t)dW js
 .
The probability of the systemic event (2.5) becomes
P
(
min
0≤s≤T
1
N
N∑
i=1
Xis < D
)
= P
(
min
0≤s≤T
Bs <
D
σ
√
N
Nρ2 + (1− ρ2)
)
= 2Φ
(
D
σ
√
T
√
N
Nρ2 + (1− ρ2)
)
.
From the formula above, we see that in the correlated case (ρ 6= 0), the prob-
ability of systemic risk does not vanish as N becomes large, instead it converges to
2Φ
(
D
σ|ρ|√T
)
. This is in dramatic contrast with the independent case (ρ = 0) where
the probability of systemic risk is exponentially small in N . We illustrate this insta-
bility created by the common noise in Figure 2.4.
3. Constructions of Exact Nash Equilibria
We now return to the model where each bank controls its rate of borrowing and
lending and we search for Nash equilibria of the system (1.2-1.5). We first construct
open-loop equilibria using the Pontryagin stochastic maximum principle leading nat-
urally to the solution of Forward-Backward SDEs (FBSDEs). Next, we construct
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Fig. 2.4. One realization of N = 10 trajectories of the coupled diffusions with independent
Brownian motions (2.1) (left plot) and trajectories of the coupled diffusions with correlated Brownian
motions with ρ = 0.5 (2.6) (right plot) using the common a = 10. The solid horizontal line represents
the “default” level D = −0.7.
closed-loop Markovian equilibria using two different approaches: the first one based
on a modified version of Pontryagin stochastic maximum principle used in the open-
loop case, and the other one based on the dynamic programming principle leading to
the solution Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) PDEs. Recall that in all cases we try to
find an equilibrium for the following borrowing-and-lending problem. The dynamics
of the log-capitalizations Xit for i = 1, · · · , N are in the form:
dXit =
[
a(Xt −Xit) + αit
]
dt+ σ
(√
1− ρ2dW it + ρdW 0t
)
, (3.1)
where W it , i = 0, 1, . . . , N are independent Brownian motions, σ > 0 and a ≥ 0. Bank
i ∈ {1, · · · , N} controls its rate of lending and borrowing (to a central bank) at time
t by choosing the control αit in order to minimize
J i(α1, · · · , αN ) = E
{∫ T
0
fi(Xt, α
i
t)dt+ gi(X
i
T )
}
, (3.2)
with
fi(x, α
i) =
[
1
2
(αi)2 − qαi(x− xi) + 
2
(x− xi)2
]
, (3.3)
gi(x) =
c
2
(
x− xi)2 , (3.4)
and where fi(x, α) is convex in (x, α) under the assumption q
2 ≤ .
Our model falls in the class of Linear-Quadratic (LQ) Mean-Field games. What
differentiates the various problems is the set of admissible strategies {αit, i = 1, · · · , N}
searched for equilibria.
3.1. Open-Loop Equilibria
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In the deterministic case (σ = 0), the open-loop problem corresponds to search-
ing for an equilibrium among strategies which are (deterministic) functions {αit, i =
1, · · · , N} given at time t = 0 and from which {(Xit), i = 1 · · · , N} are deduced by
(3.1). See for instance [1].
In the stochastic case (σ > 0), the open-loop problem consists in searching for an
equilibrium among strategies {αit, i = 1, · · · , N} which are adapted processes satis-
fying some integrability property such as E
(∫ T
0
|αit|dt
)
< ∞, and most importantly,
from which the dynamics of {(Xit), i = 1 · · · , N} are deduced by (3.1). See [3] for
example.
Using the Pontryagin approach, the Hamiltonian for bank i is given by
Hi(x1, · · · , xN , yi,1, · · · , yi,N , α1, · · · , αN ) (3.5)
=
N∑
k=1
[
a(øx− xk) + αk] yi,k + 1
2
(αi)2 − qαi(øx− xi) + 
2
(øx− xi)2.
The forward dynamics of the states can be rewritten as:
dXit = ∂yi,iH
i(Xt, Y
i
t , αt)dt+ σ
(√
1− ρ2dW it + ρdW 0t
)
, (3.6)
with initial conditions Xi0 = x
i. Even though they do not appear (yet) in the above
forward dynamics, the processes Y it = (Y
i,j
t , j = 1, · · · , N) are the adjoint processes
satisfying the backward equations
dY i,jt = −∂xjHi(Xt, Y it , αt)dt+
N∑
k=0
Zi,j,kt dW
k
t , (3.7)
with terminal conditions Y i,jT = ∂xjgi(XT ) and where the processes Z
i,j,k
t are adapted
and square integrable. The necessary condition of the Pontryagin stochastic maximum
principle suggests that one minimizes the Hamiltonian Hk with respect to αk. See
for example the discussion of the Isaacs conditions in [3]. This leads to the choice:
αˆk = −yk,k + q(øx− xk). (3.8)
In order to prove that these candidates actually form a Nash equilibrium, we assume
that all players are making that choice, and let player i finds his best response by
solving the BSDE (3.7) to identify his own adjoint process. The partial derivatives of
the Hamiltonian Hi are:
∂yi,iH
i = (a+ q)(øx− xi)− yi,i,
∂xjH
i =
a+ q
N
N∑
k=1
(yi,k − yi,j) + (− q2)(øx− xi)( 1
N
− δi,j)
where we used the usual notation δi,j = 1 if i = j and δi,j = 0 if i 6= j.
The particular forms of the Hamiltonian Hi and the terminal conditions for the
backward equations suggest the ansatz
Y i,jt = φt(
1
N
− δi,j)(øXt −Xit), (3.9)
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where φt is a deterministic function satisfying the terminal condition φT = c. Using
this ansatz, a careful computation shows that the backward equations (3.7) become
dY i,jt = (
1
N
− δi,j)(øXt −Xit)
[
(a+ q)φt − (− q2)
]
dt+
N∑
k=0
Zi,j,kt dW
k
t . (3.10)
The forward equation (3.6) becomes
dXit =
[
a+ q + (1− 1
N
)φt
]
(øXt −Xit)dt+ σ
(√
1− ρ2dW it + ρdW 0t
)
, (3.11)
which by summation gives
døXt = σρdW
0
t + σ
√
1− ρ2
(
1
N
N∑
k=1
dW it
)
. (3.12)
Consequently, one obtains
d(øXt−Xit) = −
[
a+ q + (1− 1
N
)φt
]
(øXt−Xit)dt+σ
√
1− ρ2
(
1
N
N∑
k=1
dW kt − dW it
)
.
(3.13)
Differentiating the ansatz (3.9) and using (3.13), we get
dY i,jt = (
1
N
− δi,j)(øXt −Xit)
[
φ˙t − φt
(
a+ q + (1− 1
N
)φt
)]
dt
+φt(
1
N
− δi,j)σ
√
1− ρ2
(
1
N
N∑
k=1
dW kt − dW it
)
(3.14)
where φ˙t denotes the time-derivative of φt. Comparing the two Itoˆ decompositions
(3.10) and (3.14), the martingale terms give the processes Zi,j,kt
Zi,j,0t = 0, Z
i,j,k
t = φtσ
√
1− ρ2( 1
N
− δi,j)( 1
N
− δi,k) for k = 1, · · · , N,
which turn out to be determistic in our case and hence adapted. Identifying the drift
terms show that the function φt must satisfy the scalar Riccati equation
φ˙t = 2(a+ q)φt + (1− 1
N
)φ2t − (− q2), (3.15)
with the terminal condition φT = c. This equation can be solved explicitly. We defer
the solution to Section 3.4 where we will provide a comparison with the closed-loop
case for which a similar equation appears. We also defer to Section 4 the discussion
of the financial interpretation of this equilibrium which will be similar to the one for
the closed-loop equilibrium.
Note that the form (3.8) of the control αit, and the ansatz (3.9) combine to give:
αit =
[
q + φt(1− 1
N
)
]
(øXt −Xit). (3.16)
It is interesting to remark that these controls, while constructed to form an open-
loop equilibrium, are in fact in closed-loop feedback form! In this equilibrium, each
bank i can implement its strategy by knowing øXt − Xit . Further implications will
be discussed in Section 4, but we note here that since the observation of øXt −Xit is
needed, it is natural to search for equilibria when the admissible strategies allow for
the use of this observation, that is closed-loop strategies which are discussed next.
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3.2. Closed-Loop Equilibria, still via the FBSDE Approach
In this section we solve for an exact Nash equilibrium in closed-loop form when
the players/banks at time t have complete information of the states of all the other
players at time t, or in other words we allow feedback strategies.
In this context, when all the other players have chosen strategies in feedback form
given by deterministic functions αk(t, x) of time and state, the Hamiltonian of player
i is given by (see [3]):
Hi(x, yi,1, · · · , yi,N , α1(t, x), · · · , αit, · · · , αN (t, x)) (3.17)
=
∑
k 6=i
[
a(øx− xk) + αk(t, x)] yi,k + [a(øx− xi) + αi] yi,i
+
1
2
(αi)2 − qαi(øx− xi) + 
2
(øx− xi)2,
As in the open-loop case but now with the Hamiltonian (3.17), the forward dynamics
of the states for i = 1, · · · , N are given by (3.6) and the backward equations are as in
(3.7). Minimizing Hi over αi gives the choices:
αˆi = −yi,i + q(øx− xi), i = 1, · · · , N, (3.18)
and we again make the ansatz
Y i,jt = ηt
(
1
N
− δi,j
)
(øXt −Xit), (3.19)
where ηt is a deterministic function satisfying the terminal condition ηT = c. With
the choices (3.18) we get
αk(t, x) =
[
q + ηt(1− 1
N
)
]
(øx− xk),
∂xjα
k(t, x) =
[
q + ηt(1− 1
N
)
]
(
1
N
− δk,j),
and a careful computation using the Hamiltonian (3.17) reduces the backward equa-
tions to
dY i,jt = −∂xjHidt+
N∑
k=0
Zi,j,kt dW
k
t
= (
1
N
− δi,j)(øXt −Xit)
[
(a+ q)ηt − 1
N
(
1
N
− 1)η2t + q2 − 
]
dt
+
N∑
k=0
Zi,j,kt dW
k
t , (3.20)
with terminal conditions Y i,jT = c(
1
N − δi,j)(XT −XiT ).
The forward equations become:
dXit = ∂yi,iH
idt+ σ
(√
1− ρ2dW it + ρdW 0t
)
(3.21)
=
[
a+ q + (1− 1
N
)ηt
]
(Xt −Xit)dt+ σ
(√
1− ρ2dW it + ρdW 0t
)
,
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and by summation we deduce
døXt = σ
(
ρdW 0t +
√
1− ρ2 1
N
N∑
k=1
dW kt
)
. (3.22)
Differentiating the ansatz (3.19) and using the form (3.21)-(3.22) of the forward dy-
namics, we get:
dY i,jt =
(
1
N
− δi,j
)
(øXt −Xit)
[
η˙t − ηt
(
a+ q + (1− 1
N
)ηt
)]
dt
+ηt(
1
N
− δi,j)σ
√
1− ρ2
N∑
k=1
(
1
N
− δi,k)dW kt . (3.23)
Next, identifying term by term the two Itoˆ decompositions (3.20) and (3.23), we
obtain from the martingale terms
Zi,j,0t = 0, Z
i,j,k
t = ηtσ
√
1− ρ2( 1
N
− δi,j)( 1
N
− δi,k) for k = 1, · · · , N,
which are indeed adapted and square integrable, and from the drift terms:
η˙t − ηt
(
a+ q + (1− 1
N
)ηt
)
= (a+ q)ηt − 1
N
(
1
N
− 1)η2t + q2 − .
Therefore, ηt must satisfy the scalar Riccati equation
η˙t = 2(a+ q)ηt + (1− 1
N2
)η2t − (− q2), (3.24)
with the terminal condition ηT = c. Equation (3.24) admits the solution
ηt =
−(− q2)
(
e(δ
+−δ−)(T−t) − 1
)
− c
(
δ+e(δ
+−δ−)(T−t) − δ−
)
(
δ−e(δ+−δ−)(T−t) − δ+)− c(1− 1N2 ) (e(δ+−δ−)(T−t) − 1) , (3.25)
where we used the notation
δ± = −(a+ q)±
√
R, (3.26)
with
R := (a+ q)2 +
(
1− 1
N2
)
(− q2) > 0. (3.27)
Observe that ηt is well defined for any t ≤ T since the denominator in (3.25) can be
written as
−
(
e(δ
+−δ−)(T−t) + 1
)√
R−
(
a+ q + c
(
1− 1
N2
))(
e(δ
+−δ−)(T−t) − 1
)
,
which stays negative because δ+ − δ− = 2√R > 0. In fact, using q2 ≤ , we see that
ηt is positive with ηT = c as required as illustrated in Figure 4.1.
We delay the discussion of the implications of our analysis in terms of banking
system to Section 4. We first briefly present the dynamic programming approach to
the problem which produces the same equilibrium as the one obtained in this section.
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3.3. Closed-Loop Equilibria via the HJB Approach
In the Markovian setting, the value function of player i is given by
V i(t, x) = inf
α
Et,x
{∫ T
t
fi(Xt, α
i
t)dt+ gi(X
i
T )
}
,
with the cost functions fi and gi given in (3.3) and (3.4), and where the dynamics of
Xt is given as before by:
dXit =
[
a(Xt −Xit) + αit
]
dt+ σ
(√
1− ρ2dW it + ρdW 0t
)
, i = 1, · · · , N.
Using the dynamic programming principle in search for a closed-loop equilibrium, the
corresponding HJB equations read
∂tV
i + inf
α
{ N∑
j=1
[
a
(
x− xj)+ αj] ∂xjV i
+
σ2
2
N∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
(
ρ2 + δj,k(1− ρ2)
)
∂xjxkV
i
+
(αi)2
2
− qαi (x− xi)+ 
2
(øx− xi)2
}
= 0, (3.28)
with terminal conditions V i(T, x) = c2 (øx − xi)2. Assuming that all controls αj for
j 6= i are chosen, player i will choose the optimal strategy αˆi = q(øx − xi) − ∂xiV i
where V i is still unknown. Next, assuming that all players are following the strategies
αˆi = q(øx− xi)− ∂xiV i, the HJB equations (3.28) become
∂tV
i +
N∑
j=1
[
(a+ q)
(
x− xj)− ∂xjV j] ∂xjV i
+
σ2
2
N∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
(
ρ2 + δj,k(1− ρ2)
)
∂xjxkV
i
+
1
2
(− q2) (x− xi)2 + 1
2
(∂xiV
i)2 = 0. (3.29)
We then make the ansatz
V i(t, x) =
η˜t
2
(øx− xi)2 + µt, (3.30)
where η˜t and µt are deterministic functions satisfying η˜T = c and µT = 0 in order to
match the terminal conditions for V i. Note that the adjoint variables yi,j introduced
in the FBSDE approach correspond to ∂xjV
i and the ansatz (3.30) corresponds to
the ansatz (3.19). The optimal strategies will be
αˆi = q(øXt −Xit)− ∂xiV i =
(
q + (1− 1
N
)η˜t
)
(øXt −Xit), (3.31)
and the controlled dynamics will become
dXit =
(
a+ q + (1− 1
N
)η˜t
)
(Xt −Xit)dt+ σ
(√
1− ρ2dW it + ρdW 0t
)
. (3.32)
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Using
∂xjV
i = η˜t(
1
N
− δi,j)
(
x− xi) , ∂xjxkV i = η˜t( 1N − δi,j)( 1N − δi,k),
plugging into (3.29), and canceling terms in
(
x− xi)2 and state-independent terms,
we obtain
˙˜ηt = 2(a+ q)η˜t + (1− 1
N2
)η˜2t − (− q2), (3.33)
µ˙t = −1
2
σ2(1− ρ2)
(
1− 1
N
)
η˜t, (3.34)
with the terminal conditions η˜T = c and µT = 0. Therefore, η˜t must satisfy the
same Riccati equation as the one satisfied by ηt (3.24). They have the same terminal
conditions and by unicity of the solution for this equation, we deduce that η˜t = ηt
for all t ≤ T and, consequently, the two closed-loop approaches (FBSDE and HJB)
produce the same equilibrium. The explicit solution for ηt is given by (3.25) and,
furthermore, the solution µt of (3.34) with the terminal condition µT = 0 is given by
µt =
1
2
σ2(1− ρ2)
(
1− 1
N
)∫ T
t
η˜s ds, (3.35)
and the value functions V i under this exact Nash equilibrium are given by (3.30). Note
that the correlation, quantified by the parameter ρ, affects the controls αˆit given by
(3.31) only through the dynamics of øXt−Xit since ηt does not depend on ρ. However,
it affects the value function V i given by (3.30) also through the state-independent term
µt.
3.4. Comparison of the Open- and Closed-Loop Equilibria
Our analysis in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 shows that the two equilibria we obtained
are very similar. In fact, the only difference is that in the open-loop case we obtained
the Riccati equation (3.15) for the function φt (with a factor (1− 1N ) in front of φ2t ),
and in the closed-loop case we obtained the Riccati equation (3.24) for the function
ηt (with a factor (1− 1N2 ) in front of η2t ).
In the closed-loop case we saw that the optimal strategy is given by
αit =
[
q + (1− 1
N
)ηt
]
(øXt −Xit),
and the forward dynamics are:
dXit =
[
a+ q + (1− 1
N
)ηt
]
(Xt −Xit)dt+ σ
(√
1− ρ2dW it + ρdW 0t
)
,
with
døXt = σ
(
ρdW 0t +
√
1− ρ2 1
N
N∑
k=1
dW kt
)
.
These equations are identical in the open-loop case with ηt replaced by φt. Note that
ηt is given explicitly by formula (3.25) and φt can be obtained similarly by replacing
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Fig. 3.1. Plots of φt (solid line) and ηt (dashed line) with N = 10, a = 1, q = 1,  = 10, T = 1,
and c = 0 on the left, c = 1 on the right.
the factor (1− 1N2 ) by (1− 1N ) (as well as in δ± given by (3.26) and R given by (3.27)
involved in that formula).
In Figure 3.1, we show the functions φt and ηt involved respectively in the open-
loop and closed-loop strategies. As expected, the difference is relatively small for
N = 10. However, it is enhanced by our choice of  = 10 giving a rather large factor
−q2 in front of (1− 1N ) in the open-loop case or in front of (1− 1N2 ) in the closed-loop
case. Note that the presence of a terminal cost c = 1 in the right panel produces a
significant difference.
The individual value functions can be calculated as follows. Considering for in-
stance the closed-loop case, we want to calculate
V i(x) = E
{∫ T
0
[
1
2
(αi)2 − qαi(Xt −Xit) +

2
(Xt −Xit)2
]
dt+
c
2
(XT −XiT )2
}
,
where x is the initial position of the system and (αit, X
i
t , øXt) are given by the equa-
tions above. Then, one easily obtains by direct computation
V i(x) =
1
2
∫ T
0
[
− q2 + (1− 1
N
)2η2t
]
E
{
(Xt −Xit)2
}
dt+
c
2
E
{
(XT −XiT )2
}
,
with
E
{
(Xt −Xit)2
}
= (øx− xi)2e−2
∫ t
0
(a+q+(1− 1N )ηs)ds
+(1− 1
N
)σ2(1− ρ2)
∫ t
0
e−2
∫ t
s
(a+q+(1− 1N )ηu)duds.
The formula in the open-loop case is simply obtained by replacing ηt by φt.
In Figure 3.2, we compare the value functions V i in the open-loop and closed-loop
equilibria for a choice of parameters and as N →∞.
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Fig. 3.2. Plots of the value function V i as N increases: open loop (solid line), closed loop
(dashed line), and common limit as N →∞ (dotted line) with a = 1, q = 1,  = 10, ρ = 0.2, T = 1,
and c = 10.
4. Financial Implications
The comments below made in the case of the closed-loop equilibrium with the
function ηt would be identical in the case of the open-loop equilibrium with ηt replaced
by φt.
1. Once the function ηt has been obtained in (3.25), bank i implements its
strategy by using its control αˆi given by (3.31). It requires its own log-
reserve Xit but also the average reserve øXt which may or may not be known
to the individual bank i. Observe that the average øXt is given by (3.22),
and is identical to the average found in Section 2.4. Therefore, systemic risk
occurs in the same manner as in the case of uncontrolled dynamics with or
without common noise as presented respectively in Sections 2.4 and 2.3.
2. However, (3.32) shows that the control affects the rate of borrowing and lend-
ing by adding the time-varying component q+ (1− 1N )ηt to the uncontrolled
rate a.
3. In fact, from (3.32) rewritten as
dXit =
(
a+ q + (1− 1
N
)ηt
)
1
N
N∑
j=1
(Xjt −Xit)dt (4.1)
+σ
(√
1− ρ2dW it + ρdW 0t
)
,
we see that the effect of the banks using their optimal strategies corresponds
to inter-bank borrowing and lending at the increased effective rate
At := a+ q + (1− 1
N
)ηt
with no central bank (or a central bank acting as an instantaneous clearing
house). As a consequence, under this equilibrium, the system is operating
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Fig. 4.1. Plots of ηt with c = 0, a = 1, q = 1,  = 2 and T = 1 on the left, T = 100 on the
right with øη ∼ 0.24 (here we used 1/N ≡ 0).
as if banks were borrowing from and lending to each other at the rate At,
and the net effect is additional liquidity quantified by the rate of lend-
ing/borrowing.
Note that the comment above is valid not only if a > 0, in which case the
effect of the game is to increase the rate of interbank lending and borrowing,
but also if a = 0, in which case the effect of the game is to “create” an
interbank lending and borrowing activity. In both cases, the central bank
acts as a clearing house but needs to provide the information øXt so that
individual banks can implement their strategies.
4. Observe that the presence of a common noise (quantified by ρ) does not affect
the form of the optimal strategies (the function ηt does not depend on ρ).
However it affects the value function V i(t, x) and the dynamics Xit , and, as
we have seen in Section 2.4, it has a drastic effect on systemic risk.
5. It is also interesting to note that for T large, most of the time (T − t large),
ηt is mainly constant. For instance, with c = 0,
lim
T→∞
ηt =
− q2
−δ− := øη,
as illustrated on right panel of Figure 4.1. Therefore, in this infinite-horizon
equilibrium, banks are borrowing and lending to each other at the constant
rate
A := a+ q + (1− 1
N
)øη. (4.2)
In Figure 4.2 we show the constant effective rates A (for infinite horizon) for
the open-loop and closed-loop equilibria as N increases. Note that liquidity
(quantified by the effective rate of lending/borrowing A) is higher under the
open-loop equilibrium and increases with N .
In the following section, we discuss asymptotics as N →∞.
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Fig. 4.2. Plots of the effective rate A (4.2) for the open-loop equilibrium (solid line) and for
the closed-loop equilibrium (dashed line) with a = 1, q = 1,  = 10, T = 1, and as N increases. The
dotted line shows the common limit as N →∞
5. Approximate Nash Equilibria
Why would we want an approximate Nash equilibrium when we can compute an
exact one?
The game presented in the previous section was essentially designed to provide
explicit Nash equilibria, and the fact that it does is already remarkable! However,
slight modifications, even minor, dramatically change the equilibrium structures. For
instance, the presence in the dynamics of the Xit or in the objective functions J
i of
a nonlinear term in øXt renders the computation of exact Nash equilibria hopeless.
The Mean Field Game strategy is based on the solution of effective equations in the
limit N →∞, providing through the theory of the propagation of chaos, approximate
Nash equilibria for the case N finite and large. We review this strategy in the context
of the model presented in the previous section, and compare its output to the exact
solutions derived earlier.
5.1. The Mean Field Game / FBSDE Approach
If it was not for the presence of a common noise, we could apply the results of
[5] to obtain approximate Nash equilibria from the solution of the Mean Field Game
(MFG). Notice that linear quadratic MFGs are studied in [2] and [6]. While the
latter does not include the cross term −qα(øx − xi) in the running cost of player
i, the proofs of [6] apply mutatis mutandis to the model of the present paper when
ρ = 0. We review the MFG strategy. It is based on the following three steps:
1. Fix (mt)t≥0, which should be thought of as a candidate for the limit of Xt as
N →∞:
mt = lim
N→∞
øXt.
Because of the presence of the common noise, (mt)t≥0 is a process adapted
to the filtration generated by W 0 and one should think of mt as a function
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of (W 0s )s≤t;
2. Solve the one-player standard control problem
inf
α=(αt)∈A
E
{∫ T
0
[
α2t
2
− qαt(mt −Xt) + 
2
(mt −Xt)2
]
dt+
c
2
(mT −XT )2
}
,
subject to the dynamics
dXt = [a(mt −Xt) + αt] dt+ σ
(
ρdW 0t +
√
1− ρ2dWt
)
,
where W 0t and Wt are independent Brownian motions, independent of the
initial value X0 which may be a square integrable random variable ξ.
3. Solve the fixed point problem: find mt so that mt = E[Xt | (W 0s )s≤t] for all
t.
We treat the above stochastic control problem as a problem of control of non-
Markovian dynamics with random coefficients. The Hamiltonian of the system is
given by
H(t, x, y, α) = [a(mt − x) + α] y + 1
2
α2 − qα(mt − x) + 
2
(mt − x)2,
which is strictly convex in (x, α) under the condition q2 ≤  and attains its minimum
at
∂H
∂α
= 0 −→ αˆ = q(mt − x)− y.
The corresponding adjoint forward-backward equations are given by
dXt =
∂H
∂y
(αˆ)dt+ σ
(
ρdW 0t +
√
1− ρ2dWt
)
(5.1)
= [(a+ q)(mt −Xt)− Yt] dt+ σ
(
ρdW 0t +
√
1− ρ2dWt
)
, X0 = ξ
dYt = −∂H
∂x
(αˆ)dt+ Z0t dW
0
t + ZtdWt (5.2)
=
[
(a+ q)Yt + (− q2)(mt −Xt)
]
dt+ Z0t dW
0
t + ZtdWt,
YT = c(XT −mT ),
for some adapted square integrable processes (Z0t , Zt). Despite its simple looking
structure, such linear systems do not always have solutions. The existence of a solution
in the present situation is argued in [6] where a solution is shown to exist. To identify
it in the present situation, we use the notation mXt = E[Xt | (W 0s )s≤t] and mYt =
E[Yt | (W 0s )s≤t]. Taking conditional expectation given (W 0s )s≤t in the second equation
(5.2), and using the fact that in equilibrium (i.e. after solving for the fixed point), we
have mt = m
X
t for all t ≤ T which in turn implies mYT = c(mXT −mT ) = 0, we obtain:
mYt = −
∫ T
t
e(a+q)(s−t)Z0sdW
0
s . (5.3)
Next, taking conditional expectations of both sides of equation (5.1), we deduce that,
in equilibrium, we shall have
dmXt = −mYt dt+ ρσdW 0t . (5.4)
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Now, we make the (educated) ansatz
Yt = −ηt(mt −Xt), (5.5)
for some deterministic function t ↪→ ηt to be determined. Differentiating this ansatz
and using (5.1) and (5.4) leads to
dYt = −η˙t(mt −Xt)dt− ηtd(mt −Xt) (5.6)
=
[
(−η˙t + ηt(a+ q + ηt)) (mt −Xt) + ηtmYt
]
dt+ ηtσ
√
1− ρ2dWt.
Plugging the ansatz (5.5) in (5.2) gives
dYt =
[−(a+ q)ηt + (− q2)] (mt −Xt)dt+ Z0t dW 0t + ZtdWt. (5.7)
Identifying the two Itoˆ decompositions (5.6) and (5.7), we deduce first from the mar-
tingale terms that Z0t ≡ 0 and Zt = ηtσ
√
1− ρ2. Thus, from (5.3) we obtain mYt = 0,
and equating the drift terms we see that ηt must be solution to the Riccati equation
η˙t = 2(a+ q)ηt + η
2
t − (− q2), (5.8)
with terminal condition ηT = c. As expected, the solution for ηt is given explicitly in
(3.25) after taking the limit N →∞. Observe that from mYt = 0 and (5.4) we deduce
that mXt = E(ξ) + ρσW 0t which will enter in the optimal control (q + ηt)(mXt −Xt).
An important result of the theory of MFGs (see for example [5]) is the fact that,
once a solution to the MFG is found, on can use it to construct approximate Nash
equilibria for the finitely many players games. Here, if one assumes that each player
is given the information øXt, and if player i uses the strategy
αit = (q + ηt)(øXt −Xit),
which is the limit as N →∞ of the strategy used in the finite players game, one sees
how solving the limiting MFG problem can provide approximate Nash equilibria for
which the financial implications are identical as the ones given in Section 4 for the
exact Nash equilibria.
5.2. The Mean Field Game / HJB Approach
It is interesting to go through the derivation of the MFG solution using the HJB
approach since it involves additional difficulties due to the presence of the common
noise. In our toy model, it can be handled explicitly and we briefly outline this
derivation.
For Markovian strategies of the form α(t, x), the dynamics are given as previously
by
dXt = [a(mt −Xt) + α(t,Xt)] dt+ σ
(
ρdW 0t +
√
1− ρ2dWt
)
.
Here, we should think as (W 0t ) as given, so that the forward equation for the condi-
tional density of Xt becomes a stochastic PDE (SPDE) which can be written as
dpt =
{
−∂x [(a(mt − x) + α(t, x)) pt] + 1
2
σ2(1− ρ2)∂xxpt
}
dt− ρσ(∂xpt)dW 0t ,
with the initial density p0 being the density of ξ. Here α(t, x) is given and mt =∫
xpt(x)dx. Consequently, mt, the conditional mean of Xt given W
0 is a stochastic
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process which will turn out to be Markovian with its infinitesimal generator denoted
by Lmdt + ρσ(∂m)dW 0t . The HJB equation for the value function V (t, x,m) can be
written as
dV +
[
1
2
σ2(1− ρ2)∂xxV + LmV + (∂xmV )d〈m,X〉
dt
]
dt
+ inf
α
{
[a(m− x) + α] ∂xV + α
2
2
− qα(m− x) + 
2
(m− x)2
}
dt
+ ρσ(∂mV )dW
0
t + ρσ(∂xV )dW
0
t = 0.
Next, we minimize in α to get αˆ = q(m−x)−∂xV , and we make the ansatz V (t, x,m) =
ηt
2 (m − x)2 + µt. Plugging in the forward equation for pt, multiplying by x, and
integrating with respect to x gives
dmt = ρσdW
0
t .
Therefore, conditionally in W 0, LmV = 0 and d〈m,X〉 = 0. Then, verifying that the
ansatz satisfies the HJB equation, by canceling terms in (m − x)2 we obtain that ηt
must satisfy the Riccati equation (5.8), and canceling state-independent terms leads
to µ˙t = − 12σ2(1− ρ2)ηt and therefore
µt =
1
2
σ2(1− ρ2)
∫ T
t
ηsds.
5.3. Controlling McKean-Vlasov Dyamics: Possibly a Different Solu-
tion
In this subsection we search for a different type of approximate equilibrium. As
before, we require that all the banks use the same feedback function α to compute
their lending and borrowing rate from their private information, but we now work with
a different notion of equilibrium. We now base the notion of a critical point for the
optimization on a simultaneous deviation of all the strategies at once. So instead of
stress-testing by perturbing the lending and borrowing policy one at a time like in the
search for Nash equilibria, we perturb them simultaneously. This form of equilibrium
was tentatively called franchised equilibrium in [4]. See also [6] for a comparison with
the results of the MFG models. Our interest in this model comes from the results of
these two papers which show that, despite strong similarities, these two models can
lead to different solutions, even in the case of linear - quadratic models.
The theory of the propagation of chaos implies that, when N →∞, the individual
states Xit become independent and identically distributed, their common distribution
being the law of the solution of an equation of the McKean-Vlasov type:
dXt = [a(E[Xt]−Xt) + α(t,Xt)]dt+ σdWt, (5.9)
for some Wiener process W . See for example [21] or [16]. Accordingly, the expected
cost that the players try to minimize becomes
J(φ) = E
[ ∫ T
0
f(Xt,PXt , α(Xt))dt+ g(XT ,PXT )
]
,
where we use the notation PY to denote the law of the random variable Y . In the
linear-quadratic case at hand, both functions f and g do not depend upon the entire
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distribution PXt , but only upon the first two moments E[Xt] and E[X2t ]. The search
for equilibrium considered in this subsection amounts to minimizing J(α) over a set of
admissible feedback functions α under the constraint (5.9). The probabilistic approach
to the solution of this problem is developed in [4] where a Pontryagin stochastic
maximum principle is proved in full generality. Adjoint equations are identified and
it is shown that there are different than in the MFG case. However, in the present
situation, the fact that the cost functions f(x, µ, α) and g(x, µ) depend only upon
the distance from the argument x to the mean of the measure µ implies that the
expectation E[Yt] of the adjoint process vanishes, and the correction to the driver of
the MFG adjoint equation vanishes as well. In the notation of [6], this corresponds
to the fact that øq = −q and ømt = −mt, implying that the differences exhibited
there between the solutions of linear quadratic MFG and McKean-Vlasov controlled
dynamics do not exist in this instance. Again, this is due to the special form of
interaction between the players through øXt −Xit .
In any case, the two forms of approximate equilibria, though different in general,
do coincide in our model of lending and borrowing!
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